In this paper, we study an important paradox of Deaton and Paxson (1998) : Using the Barten model of economies of scale, Deaton and Paxson predict that the share of food consumption in total expenditure should increase as household size rises with per capita expenditure held constant, while their empirical evidence shows the opposite. This paradox has important implications for the measurement of poverty and inequality. Consistent with predictions of the Barten model, we show that the food share in food and a more public good (housing) increases with family size, and that the elasticity of the share of food with respect to family size is larger for poorer households. Therefore, the Deaton-Paxson Paradox cannot simply be due to an incorrect theoretical model. We provide evidence that food preparation time may be important in understanding this puzzle.
Introduction
Households enhance the welfare of constituents by sharing shelter, appliances, and economizing in services such as maintenance, childcare and food preparation. Resources so conserved can be applied to more personal goods such as food and transportation. Economizing by households is an important factor to consider when measuring poverty and inequality. In 1895, Ernst Engel observed the share of food consumption in total consumption can be used to measure economic welfare across households with different sizes and incomes, with a smaller food share 1 in larger and/or richer households. Although more elaborate methods have been developed, 2 using food share or budget share of other bundle of "necessities" as a proxy for welfare remains a viable method in measuring poverty and studying equivalence scales. 3 One main reason is that the Engel method requires minimum amount of data: only one demand equation, often in the form of the share of food in total expenditure, is necessary. A single cross-section survey data on household expenditure is sufficient and no price variations are needed in estimating the model.
At the same per capita expenditure (PCE), why may a larger household enjoys higher economic welfare by having lower shares in food consumption? One plausible reason is the existence of economies scale in public goods such as shelter. However, using a model about economies of scale in Barten (1964) , Deaton and Paxson (1998) (D&P hereafter) derived an implication that at the same PCE level, food share should increase with household size, inconsistent to Engel's empirical observation and the evidence presented in D&P. This result is considered entirely paradoxical by D&P. Moreover, one may derive another implication from the Barten model that the elasticity of the budget share of food with respect to household size should be in general larger in value for poorer households. This result is also inconsistent with evidence showed in D&P.
When there is inconsistency between empirical data and a theoretical model, this naturally casts doubt on the model. However, D&P adopt the Barten model as a maintained hypothesis and therefore view their findings as paradoxical. In this paper, we seek to test the Barten model more completely. In particular, we test two predictions of the Barten model. In a two-good model with food and a more public good, the Barten model predicts that the food share should rise with family size. Deaton and Paxson found that the share of food in total consumption decreases with family size. We follow the Barten model more precisely by examining food share in food and a more public good (housing). When we do so, we find that the food share does increase with family size. Likewise, when we analyze food share in food and a more private good (transportation), we observe that the food share decreases with family size, again as predicted by the Barten model. Specifications different from D&P's show that "food consumed away from home" decreases with family size, suggesting that economies of scale in food preparation time may be a key factor in understanding this puzzle. Further, the Barten model predicts that the elasticity of food share with respect to household size should be larger for poorer households, while the estimates of Deaton and Paxson shows the opposite. We show that estimating by a pooled regression instead of separate regressions for different groups of households resolves this inconsistency. The maintained assumption in welfare comparisons is the same utility function across households. A pooled regression satisfies this assumption but not the separate regressions.
Few papers have empirically tested Barten model in the literature, with a notable exception of Muellbauer (1977) that rejected the Barten model. His test is based on the idea to compare the estimates from a pooled-sample and from separate samples. As we will argue in Section 3.2, such a test fail to satisfy implicitly maintained assumption of equal utility functions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the Barten model and the inconsistency between the model and the data. In Section 3, we present our explanation of the inconsistency. We conclude in Section 4.
The Paradox
Our starting point is the two-good model in Barten (1964) : a household with n members allocates its total expenditure x across two goods, housing h and food f , by
subject to :
where x are total expenditures and φ i (n) is the scaling function reflecting the economies of household size of good i.
The demand for food is given in Equation (2).
From Equation (2), one can show
where ff is the own-price elasticity for food, fx is the income elasticity of food, and
are measures of economies of scale of household size for each good. 4 A pure private (excludable) good has σ i = 0 while pure public good has σ i = 1.
Here, γ * in Equation (3) is the key parameter. It is the elasticity of per capita food consumption with respect to the household size. Much of the focus of D&P is about the sign and magnitude of this parameter. In particular, when food has limited substitutes ( ff is small in absolute value) and when there are significantly more economies of scale in housing than those in food (σ f /σ h is small), a general implication of the model is γ * > 0: at constant PCE, food shares should increase with household size. This prediction may also be understood intuitively. Since the share of food is food consumption per capita divided by PCE, a change in the food share at constant PCE is equivalent to a change in per capita food expenditure. Based on the Barten model, the economies of scale in shelter effectively raise the income that the household may spend on other goods, including food.
Therefore, food consumption should increase as long as it is a normal good, which is equivalent as
One may also derive another prediction of the Barten model. Consider the first partial derivatives of γ * with respect to the price elasticity ff and income elasticity fx :
The assumptions necessary for the inequalities in (5) are minimum: housing is not a pure private good (σ h > 0) and housing is "more public" than food (σ h > σ f ). One expects the income elasticity of food consumption, fx , to be larger in poorer households, and the price elasticity, ff , to be smaller in absolute value in poorer households. The inequalities in (5) imply that, for both reasons, γ * should be larger for poorer households.
Therefore, in summary, the Barten model predicts: (i) at constant PCE, the food share will rise with household size.
(ii) The (positive) effect of household size on the food share should be larger for poorer households.
The first prediction contradicts Engel's observations that the food share decreases with household size. Since the Barten model is highly plausible, Deaton and Paxson wrote: "In consequence, the estimates of economies of scale that are derived by Engel's method have no theoretical underpinning and are identified by an assertion that makes no sense."
The empirical estimates in D&P include a nonparametric representation of Engel's curves for different compositions of households, and a parametric/semi-parametric regression analysis. In particular, they estimate weighted averages of the expected food shares conditional on PCE.
where w f is the share of food consumption, and i is an index describing the composition of household (e.g., 1 adult-0 kids, 2 adults-0 kids, etc.), z equals log of per capita expenditure, and f (z) is a non-parametric kernel estimate of the density.
The parametric regression is based on Equation (7).
where x/n is per capita expenditure, n household size, n k /n is the ratio of household members who fall in one of the K groups defined by age and sex to household size, and V are control variables. 5
Similar empirical specification can also be found in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) . Since errors in w f and ln(x/n) are almost inevitably correlated, instrumental regressions may be necessary. Deaton and Paxson discussed in detail about possible bias, and argued using household cash income as an instrument variable. The main reason is cash income is highly correlated with expenditure but measured independently. Most of our regressions in this paper are instrumental regressions.
Using household consumption data from seven countries, D&P found empirical evidence contradicting the two predictions of the model. 6 Using nonparametric Engel curves as in Equation (6), they find that larger households have smaller shares of food in consumption. Using parametric and semi-parametric regressions as in Equation (7), they show that γ * is smaller for households in poorer countries. They claim that "such a result is entirely paradoxical."
The consistency between the Barten model and the data
The general predictions of the Barten model critically depend on two factors: the relative economies of scale of food and of housing, and the same functional forms in the utility functions for different households. In D&P, housing is defined broadly as all goods other than food, and it is assigned the property σ h > σ f . With such a broadly defined good, this assumption may not be true in the data.
5 Note γ in Equation (7) differs slightly from the elasticity γ * defined in Equation (3), γ * = γ/w f . Here, we use γ to remain consistent with Deaton and Paxson (1998) . 6 These countries are: United States, Great Britain, France, Taiwan, urban and rural Thailand, Pakistan and South Africa (African).
Moreover, since households in different countries or different groups may differ in their preferences, it is necessary to understand if and how such difference changes our comparisons of the elasticity of family size among different types of households.
Before we proceed our analysis, we briefly discuss three datasets used in the study. The first dataset is Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) 1990 for the United States, the second dataset is the South Africa Integrated Household Survey, and the third dataset is the second wave of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), 1994-1998. See Appendix in D&P for a description of the first and the second datasets, and Appendix A in this paper for the third dataset. The first two datasets are chosen because they are a subset of the data used in D&P, and the third one is chosen to provide additional evidence. All three datasets are easily available on the web. 7
3.1 Does the food share increase with household size?
The answer to this question depends on the relative economies of scale between food and housing.
We first turn our attention to a previous study that estimated the economies of scale of different food consumption is grouped into one good, termed as "housing", such a broadly defined "housing"
may not necessarily satisfy σ h > σ f . However, the estimates in Nelson (1988) A sufficient condition to analyze the allocation within a subset of expenditures is the weak separability of the utility function. To illustrate this condition, consider a three good model, {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 } with a total expenditure x. If a utility function can be written as u(q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ) = f (v 1 (q 1 , q 2 ), v 2 (q 3 )), the group {q 1 , q 2 } and {q 3 } are separable. Now consider an allocation of {q * 1 , q * 2 , q * 3 } from an onestep optimization. Let x * 3 be expenditure on good 3. Given (q * 3 , x * 3 ), an identical allocation of {q * 1 , q * 2 } will be obtained if q 1 and q 2 are chosen optimally subject to budget constraint x − x * 3 . This is the familiar two-stage budgeting. 8 This separability condition is satisfied for a demand function as in Equation (7).
Following D&P, we construct weighted average food shares for different household compositions, using Equation (6). We consider three different measures of food shares: as share of total expenditures, as a share of food plus shelter, and as a share of food plus transportation. The results using the US data are in Table 1 . If we use food's share in total per capita expenditure, food share decreases the most of the time as household sizes increase. For example, for an one-adult-only (1,0) family, the food share is .245. This number decreases as number of adults in adult-only family increases. These results are similar to the ones reported in Table 1 in D&P but are inconsistent with the Barten model. However, if we use food in food plus shelter, food share increases with household size. In (1,0) family, the share is now .406, but for 4-adult-only (4,0) family, this number is increased to .460. Such results are consistent with the Barten model. These relationships are also appear in Table 2 when we estimate regressions of Equation (7) that condition on several other variables. Regression results using US, South Africa and Russia data are reported in Table 2 . Only the parameter estimates for the logarithm of family size and the logarithm for PCE are reported. Three different food shares are used, food share in total expenditure in Column (1), food share in food and shelter in Column (2), and food share in food and transportation in Column (3). From the Nelson (1988) estimates, food is more public than 8 See Chapter 5 in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a more detailed description. transportation but less public than shelter, and therefore the Barten model predicts that food share in food and shelter should increase with family size, and food share in food and transportation should decrease with family size.
In Panel A where US data is used, when the share of food in total expenditures is used, the coefficient γ is -.0079, very close to the number reported in D&P, which is -.0077. However, when
we estimate the share of food in expenditures for food and housing alone, γ is .0948, positive and significant. In Column (3), when food share in food and transportation is used, the coefficient γ is significant and negative. The basic results in Panel A also hold in Panel B using the South Africa data and in Panel C using the Russia data. The estimated coefficient γ is negative in Column (1), positive in Column (2) and negative again in Column (3). Results in Column (1) replicates the results in D&P: food share in total expenditure decreases with family size. However, this does not necessarily contradict to the Barten model because it is unclear whether food is more private than the combination of all non-food goods. However, the Barten model is consistent with the data when one focuses just on expenditure on food and a more public good (shelter) and when one focuses just on expenditure on food and a more private good (transportation).
As mentioned earlier, that we can analyze consumer choices using only a subset of expenditure requires separability of utility function. To test how robust our results to this assumption, we put expenditures of other goods as an additional explanable variable for all regressions in Table 2 . 9
Estimates (not reported here) from this alternative specifications are very similar to ones reported in this paper. All of our results remain valid.
In the estimates in Column (2), the measurement of housing consumption becomes an important issue. Housing expenditures for home owners and renters are very different. For example, a large portion of expenditure on shelter for home owners is mortgage payments. It is inappropriate to assume the shelter consumption to be zero if the mortgages have been paid off. To test how robust our result to this potential measurement error, especially the result in Column (2), we 9 Same exercises are also conducted for all regressions in Table 5 . offer an alternative specification for the US data. 10 CEX offers another measure of expenditure:
RENTEQVX, which is rental equivalence of owned home. One problem of the variable RENTEQVX is that it is top-coded: in 1990 CEX, all values that are more than $1, 500 per month are coded as $1,500. Among all cases of owner-occupied households that have RENTEQVX (total # is 12820), 6.49% are top coded. This problem can be easily solved if we make an assumption about the density function of in Equation (7). Let the right hand side of Equation (7) be simplified as Xb + . Let f be food consumption, and h * be true shelter consumption.
When the shelter is rented, the true shelter consumption is the actual rents h r . For owneroccupied shelters, h * may be approximated by RENTEQVX, denoted as h e , which is top-coded at h. To summarize,
if owner occupied and h e < h h if owner occupied and h e ≥ h
It is easy to show that h * ≥ h is equivalent to ≥ f h+f − Xb. Naturally, maximum likelihood estimates are used to obtain estimates. The likelihood function is given by Equation (9).
where f (·) and F (·) are the pdf and cdf of . In Table 3 , we consider three variations: First, we let in (8) be normally distributed. In the second specification, we take the logarithm of the food share of s f , and let be normally distributed. In addition, we consider another variation of (8)
10 Among these three data sets, only CEX carries information about rental equivalence and the actual mortgage payment. The housing consumption for South Africa is imputed by the data collectors. For Russia, the housing payments include utilities. t-values are in parenthesis.
The specification of (10) share falls into interval (0, 1). We refer to the specification in (10) as "logit-transfer". To control for the possible difference between actual rents and the rental-equivalent of an owned home, we inserted a dummy for an owner-occupied residence. We also let the variance differ between owneroccupied and renters. Results for the key estimated coefficients are reported in Table 3 . In all three specifications, the parameter γ is positive and significant, which is consistent with the Barten model.
Although recognizing that there may be economies of scale in food preparation, D&P do not believe this is the answer to the Paradox. They investigate one public component in food: the economies of scale in food preparation. If it doesn't take n times as long to cook a meal for n persons as for one person, a larger household size makes home cooking per capita cheaper, whereas the per capita cost of eating away from home doesn't change. Therefore, larger households should tend to substitute toward relatively cheaper home-prepared meals. As a consequence, the share of food expenditure away from home in total expenditure should decrease with household size, i.e., γ should be negative. D&P report the results of two regressions, one for all households where γ is negative, and one for households with more than one adult. D&P concentrated on the second regression. In Table 4 , we report several variations of these regressions for our sample. Column
(1) of Table 4 reports the regression where γ is positive with a t-value of 1.9. D&P argued that the evidence showed that food consumed away from home cannot be used to support the argument that the economies of scale in food preparation is the reason for the paradox. Column (2) reports the results from an instrumental variable regression. The instrumental variable is logarithm of per capita after tax income. In such a regression, the γ coefficient becomes negative but insignificant.
In addition, we make a minor change in food away from home: we treat expenditure on alcohol consumed away from home as part of food expenditures. The reason for this is that alcohol provides calories and can be consumed as a substitute to food. 11 In CEX 1990, 12 the average consumption for food away from home was $301.5 per quarter, and the average consumption on alcohol away from home was $34.6 per quarter.
Column (3) and Column (4) report the results of the share of food and alcohol away from home in total expenditure. Column (3) has the estimates from OLS where γ is insignificant. In Column (4) where the instrumental variable regression is reported, γ becomes negative and significant, just opposite of the result in Column (1).
Two points can be learned from Table 4 where a slightly different specification leads to opposite results. First, it is natural to question the robustness of the conclusion in D&P. (a) The instrument variable is log of per capita after-tax income.
(b) t-values are in parenthesis.
scale in food preparation can be a factor to explain why γ is negative in the regressions of food share in total consumption. Second, the time factor, such as food preparation time, may be important to understand the puzzle.
So far we have showed that food share will increase with household size because of the economies of scale in more public goods such as housing. We also show that food share may decrease because of the economies of scale in food consumption itself. In both cases, individual utility level rises because sharing reduces effective per capita price on each good. In the next section, we consider another prediction of the Barten model.
Does the elasticity of food share with household size decrease as households become poorer?
Having discussed the reasons why γ < 0, we now turn to the next prediction of the Barten model:
poorer households should have larger value of γ at constant PCE. D&P have showed that estimated γ are generally smaller in values for households from poorer countries. For example, D&P show that γ are less than -.05 for Thailand, Pakistan and South Africa but is -.0077 for US, and .005 for UK. These results again contradict the prediction from the Barten model.
One key assumption necessary to derive all the predictions of the Barten model is that the utility functions and preference parameters are the same across different households. Households differ in arguments in the utility function, such as household size and expenditure. From an empirical point of view, since Equation (7) is a demand equation derived from utility function, this implies that the coefficients are common across households with the only exception of γ * . In Equation (3) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we study a paradox of D&P: Using the Barten model of economies of scale, Deaton and Paxson predicted that food share should increase with household size at the same per capita expenditure; while empirical evidence shows the opposite. This Paradox is important since it casts doubt on our practice of using food share as a measure of individual well-being. It also raises questions on how to understand the economies of scale within a household and how to measure individual welfare in different composition of households in general.
One possible reason of the Paradox may simply result from the invalidity of the Barten model.
The major objective of this paper is to test the Barten model with better formulated specifications. .054
(a) The instrumental variable is log per capita after-tax income.
Two predictions of the Barten model have been tested. First, in the two good model, the Barten model predicts that the share of the more public good will decrease with family size. We show that food share in food and a good which is more public than food (housing), food share increases with family size. Likewise, food share in food and a more private good (transportation), decreases with family size. Moreover, estimates from different specifications show that food consumed away from home decreases with family sizes, indicating that economies of scale in food preparation may be a key factor in understanding this puzzle. Second, the Barten model predicts that the elasticity of food share with respect to household size should be larger in values for poorer households; empirical work of Deaton and Paxson shows the opposite. This inconsistency is resolved by a pooled regression instead of separate regressions for different groups of households.
In summary, we have shown that the predictions of the Barten model are consistent with the data. One can take comfort to use this model to study economies of scale within a household.
However, we must point out that the key implication of the Deaton-Paxson Paradox has not been studied. As household size rises and PCE is held constant, it is shown in this paper and in D&P that food share may decrease because of economies of scale in food consumption, and increase because of economies of scale in shelter. In both cases, individual welfare increases. Theoretically, a higher individual welfare level may be related either to a higher food share or to a lower food share. In light of that, whether food share can be used to measure remains an open question. It appears, though, that empirical evidence supports that food share in total budget decreases as individual welfare rises.
B Pooled Regression vs. Separate Regression
Consider two models:
The model in Equation (A.1) constrains the coefficient on variables Z 1 and Z 2 to be the same. This model corresponds to our pooled regression where Z represent all variables other than ln(n). The model in (A.2) represents the separate regressions estimated in Deaton and Paxson. Here are only write out OLS estimates, which are:
When γ 1 = γ 2 , i.e., the true model is (A.1), estimates in (A.3) and (A.4) will be similar in the sense that both are consistent estimate of the γ. However, when γ 1 = γ 2 , i.e., the true model is (A.2), estimates in Equations (A.3) and (A.4) are different.
